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NOTES AND COMMENTS
sect is involved? Would any public official,
be he legislator or judge, dare to outrage
a large segment of the electorate by over-
ruling its religious beliefs? One advocate of
the position that the courts have gone too
far has stated that
. . . civil and religious liberties are being
broken down. The consequence is an erod-
ing away of the principles upon which the
Recent Decision:
Lawyers' Right to Incorporate
For many years, because of the fear
that the attorney-client relationship would
be undermined, attorneys have been de-
nied the right to incorporate. Recently,
however, the Florida Supreme Court, act-
ing on a request of the Florida Bar Associa-
tion, amended its Integration Rules and
Code of Ethics to allow members of the
Florida Bar to incorporate. Considering the
restricted nature of the corporation and the
possible tax advantages to be had by the
members of the bar, the Court held that
attorneys may practice law in the corpo-
rate form.1
At common law corporations could
not be formed for the purpose of practicing
law. 2 In 1910, the New York Court of
Appeals 3 flatly denied the right of attor-
neys to practice law in the corporate form,
stating that to permit a corporation to
stand between the attorney and client
1 In the Matter of The Florida Bar, - Fla. -,
133 So. 2d 554 (1961).
2 See Jones, The Professional Corporation, 27
FORDHAM L. REV. 353 (1958); Lewis, Corpo-
rate Capacity to Practice Law - A Study in
Legal Hocus Pocus, 2 MD. L. REv. 342 (1938);
Maier & Wild, Taxation of Professional Firms as
Corporations, 44 MARQ. L. REV. 127 (1960).
3 In the Matter of the Co-operative Law Co.,
198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910).
democratic state stands, and ultimate dam-
age to the nation and all its people.. . . to
sacrifice principle for expediency creates
precedent that breaks down the whole fibre
of principle and personal responsibility
upon which the welfare of the nation de-
pends. Frankly, the price is too high .... 45
45 How, Blood Transfusion - A Legal, Religious
and Medical Issue, 3 CAN. B.J. 365, 419 (1960).
would tend to subvert the high standard of
care owed by the attorney to his client.
The court further stated that the attorney
would be subject to the directions of the
employer-corporation, rather than those of
the client, and that the corporate stock
might be owned totally or in part by lay-
men, who would then in effect, be prac-
ticing law or controlling its practice. The
lack of judicial control over the corpora-
tion, since it could not be disbarred or
suspended, and the fact that unscrupulous
practitioners might find shelter from mal-
practice liability in the corporation were
other factors which persuaded the court
to forbid such incorporation.
The same reasoning was invariably
applied as the principle of law established
by the New York court was accepted
throughout the country.4 The court deci-
sions were fortified by statutes, which were
of two general types-the first forbidding
incorporation for the purpose of practicing
4Boykin v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S.E.
796 (1932); New Jersey Photo Engraving Co.
v. Carl Schonert & Sons, Inc., 95 N.J. Eq. 12,
122 Atl. 307 (Ch. 1923); Land Title Abstract
& Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193
N.E. 650 (1934); State ex rel. Lundin v. Mer-
chants Protective Corp., 105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac.
694 (1919); cf. In the Matter of Eastern Idaho
Loan & Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157
(1930).
law," and the second making the unau-
thorized practice of law by a corporation
a misdemeanor. ' The professions of medi-
cine, accounting, and architecture, to name
a few, were under the same prohibitions,
but not to the same degree as the legal pro-
fession.7
The consequence of this proscription
against the incorporation of attorneys and
other professional groups was to put them
at a decisive tax disadvantage. Since a
partner or sole proprietor cannot be an
employee of his own business," he cannot
take advantage of qualified pension plans,"
deferred compensation plans, 1" stock op-
tions at slightly below market price,'
accident, health and wage contribution
plans, ' or special employees' death bene-
fits.1 ' But where a business is incorporated,
any shareholder who is active in the busi-
ness is considered an employee as well as
S IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-102 (1947); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 15-104 (1947); N.Y. STOCK
CORP. LAW §7; Oii1o REV. CODE ANN. §1701.03
(Baldwin 1953).
; ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 42 (1958); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 25-205 (1947); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32,
§ 411 (Smith-Hurd 1954); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
ch. 105, § 8 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 14 (1957); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 280.
7See Jones, The Professional Corporation, 27
FORDHAM L. REV. 353 (1958).
"Rev. Rul. 61-157, 1961 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 35,
at 9.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a).
'0 tNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 401-04.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 421.
'2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 105.
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101(b). See gen-
erally Maier & Wild, Taxation of Professional
Firms as Corporations, 44 MARQ. L. REV. 127
(1960); Note, Qualified Pension Plans for Un-
incorporated Professional Associations, 12 STAN.
L. REV. 746 (1960).
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a proprietor and may enjoy the above-
mentioned benefits.''
Thus, pressure began to build among
professional people and was directed to-
ward gaining for themselves the same tax
advantages available to other businessmen
who could incorporate. One result of this
pressure for tax equality was the introduc-
tion in Congress in 1951 of the Jenkins-
Keogh Bill, 1' a proposal to permit self-
employed individuals and unincorporated
groups to contribute to and participate in
pension plans, to a limited extent, on terms
comparable to those incorporated in Sec-
tion 401 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. This and subsequent attempts to
enact similar legislation have met with
little success.1- It is interesting that sim-
ilar bills were passed in both England' 7
and Canada.'
Losing faith in the eventual passage
of the Jenkins-Keogh Bill, professional
groups began to exert pressure in other
directions and to look for new methods
of achieving the desired tax advantages.
Since, as a general rule, only the states
may determine who may incorporate, and
''See Rev. Rul. 61-157, 1961 Int. Rev. Bull. No.
35, at 10.
IF H.R. 4371, H.R. 4373, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1951). See Note, Favorable Tax Treatment for
Individual Pension Plans: The Jenkins-Keogh
Bill, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1953).
11; See Keogh, Social Security Legislation & the
Jenkins-Keogh Bill, 28 N.Y.B. BULL. 273 (1956);
Note, Qualified Pension Plans for Unincorporated
Professional Associations, supra note 13, at 747.
The most recent version of this legislation is
embodied in H.R. 10, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961).
17 Hosking, United Kingdom's Experience with
Pensions for Self-Employed, 97 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 313 (1958).
18 See Fairbanks, Taxation-Pension Plans for
Self-Emiployed Persons, 35 CAN. B. REV. 564
(1957).
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under what terms they may incorporate, 2
the bulk of the pressure was then focused
upon them in order to force approval of
professional corporations. However, the
state legislatures could not be dissuaded
from their traditional opposition, and a
compromise seems to have developed
which gave to professional groups some
corporate attributes. The compromise took
the form of "associations [which] have
been taxed in the same manner as corpora-
tions in every revenue act since 1913....
But nowhere has Congress undertaken to
define 'associations'.'20
United States v. Kintner was the first
tax case involving an association of pro-
fessionals in which a court upheld the
claimed corporate status for tax purposes .21
The Commissioner, motivated by this de-
cision, set up definite standards which an
association had to meet in order to qualify
for corporate tax treatment. 22 The Kintner
case and the Commissioner's subsequent
action acted as a stimulus for states to
enact legislation allowing the formation of
19 See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 8a (rev. ed.
1946).
20 See Note, supra note 13, at 754.
21 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954). In this case
an association of medical men was allowed cor-
porate status for tax purposes.
2
2 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(a)(3) (1960) pro-
vides that an "unincorporated organization shall
not be classified as an association unless such
organization has more corporate characteristics
than noncorporate characteristics." The follow-
ing are held to be characteristics of a pure cor-
poration:
(1) Associates
(2) An objective of carrying on a business
and dividing the profits
(3) Continuity of life
(4) Centralization of management
(5) Liability of corporate debts limited to
corporate property
(6) Free transferability of interests.
either professional corporations-:, or pro-
fessional associations24 which would qualify
for favorable tax treatment. Whether the
statutes call for associations or corpo-
rations, the limitations and requirements
set down by the states are basically the
same. However, despite the number of
statutes allowing professionals to incorpo-
rate or associate, attorneys were still not
permitted to practice in the corporate form,
prior to the present case. This was so be-
cause even though the legislatures have
the power to determine who may incor-
porate, 5 only the judiciary can determine
who may practice law.2 6
Florida was the first state in which
the judiciary took the necessary action to
permit attorneys to incorporate under its
Professional Service Corporation Act. In
the Matter of The Florida Bar brought
23 Ark. Laws 1961, art. 179, §2; Ark. Laws
1961, art. 471, §2; CoLo. R. Civ. P. 231, ch. 19;
Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-64 §5; Minn. Laws
1961, ch. 1, § 3; Okla. Laws 1961, art. 399, § 4;
S.D. Laws 1961, cb. 29, § 2; Wis. Laws 1961,
ch. 350, § 180.99.
24 Ala. Laws 1961, art. 865, § 2; Conn. Laws
1961, P.A. 158, § 44; Ga. Laws 1961, art. 285,
§ 3; 111. Laws 1961, art. 804, § 1; Ohio Laws
1961, art. 550, § 1785.02; Pa. Laws 1961, art.
525, § 3; Tenn. Laws 1961, ch. 181, § 1; Tex.
Laws 1961, ch. 158, §6(3).
25 In the Matter of The Florida Bar, - Fla. -,
133 So. 2d 554, 555 (1961). See also BALLAN-
rINE, CORPORATIONS § 8a (rev. ed. 1946).
21 See Howe v. State Bar of California, 212 Cal.
222, 298 Pac. 25 (1931); In the Matter of The
Florida Bar, - Fla. -, 133 So. 2d 554, 555
(1961); Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. V.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650 (1934);
In the Matter of Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac.
1152 (1918). In Colorado there was no statute
preventing professionals from incorporating, and
thus the courts were able to allow incorporation
merely by changing the rules governing admis-
sion to the Colorado Bar. COLO. R. Civ. P. 231,
ch. 19.
about this result by the Court's modifica-
tion of its Bar Integration Rules, thereby
permitting attorneys to incorporate under
the statute. But in so doing, two impor-
tant qualifications were required, i.e., that
all shareholders, officers and directors be
licensed to practice law, and that all law-
yers connected with the corporation com-
ply with the Bar Integration Rules and
general ethical standards.2 7 Canon 33 of
the Florida Code of Ethics was amended to
permit a law corporation to use a fictitious
name,26 and Canons 35 and 47 were
amended to provide that a law corporation
shall not be deemed a lay agency or in-
termediary. 29
The Court declared that the historic
reason for the prohibition against the prac-
tice of law by a corporate entity is the
preservation of the attorney-client relation-
ship. It stated:
[11f a means can be devised, which pre-
serves to the client and the public generally,
all of the traditional obligations and respon-
sibilities of the lawyer and at the same
time enables the legal profession to obtain
a benefit not otherwise available to it, we
can find no objection to the proposal.2 0
After a careful examination of the Profes-
sional Service Corporation Act, 31 and the
proposed implementing rules, the Court
concluded that the "highly personal obliga-
tion of the lawyer to his client is in no way
27 In the Matter of The Florida Bar, supra note
25.
28Canon 33, Rule B, "Ethics Governing At-
torneys." See also, In the Matter of The Florida
Bar, supra note 25.
29 Canons 35, 47, Rule B, "Ethics Governing
Attorneys." See also In the Matter of The Flor-
ida Bar, supra note 25.
:11 In the Matter of The Florida Bar, supra note
25, at -, 133 So. 2d at 556.
,1 Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-64, § 5.
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adversely affected" 32 and that the corporate
entity could not act as a shield for the
unfaithful or the unethical. Further, the
corporate entity would automatically fall
within the ambit of the Court's jurisdiction
in regard to discipline.
Although the Florida Professional
Service Corporation Act and the decision
under discussion deal with most of the
prior objections to the incorporation of
attorneys, there are certain aspects of the
problem which seemed to have been over-
looked by both the legislature and the
Court. The act provides that no shares
may be issued to individuals not licensed
to practice the profession and that no
member. may sell his shares to an unli-
censed person. 3  No provision was made,
however, to prevent such stock from de-
scending, or passing by will or attachment
of creditors to unauthorized persons.
The American Bar Association's
Opinion 303, speaking generally of profes-
sional corporations, indicates that should
any such stock fall into the hands of an
unauthorized 'person in this manner, there
would be a violation of Canon 35 which
prohibits a layman from sharing in the
profits of the corporation. 34 There would
also be violations of Canon 31, since the
layman would have a vote in'the operation
of the corporation,3 5 and of Canon 47,
since a lawyer would thereby assist a lay
agency in the practice of law. 6 These
Problems may be solved by a provision
that, unless otherwise provided for in the
articles of incorporation, the estate or
32 In the Matter of The Florida Bar, supra note
25, at-, 133 So. 2d at 556.
3: Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-64, § 9.
48 A.B.A.J. 159, 161-62 (1962).
15 Id. at 160.
'" Id. at 161.
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creditor may hold the stock for six months,
for purposes of finding a qualified buyer,
during which time, no distribution of the
profits will be paid or accrued onesuch
stock, and no power to vote will be had by
its holder, nor may the holder solicit or
obtain the confidence of any client.37
In Opinion 303, the American Bar
Association answered the question whether
lawyers can carry on the practice of law
as a professional association or professional
corporation, indicating that:
• . . It is the substance of the arrangement
and not the form which will be controlling
in determining whether the ethical restraints
imposed on the legal profession have been
violated. 'I [Necessary safeguards must as-
sure that the lawyer or lawyers rendering
the legal services will] be personally re-
sponsible to the client.3 9
The Florida statute when read in con-
junction with the case under discussion,
would seem to satisfy the Canons of Ethics,
because the attorney is still held to the
same degree of care toward the client and
remains personally liable to the client for
malpractice. In addition, the client has
recourse to the assets of the corporation
which are also under the control of the
courts. Every shareholder must be an at-
torney and cannot use the corporation as
a shield against disbarment, since he is
37M. at 160.
38ld. at 162.
39 d. at 160.
still individually held to the observance of
the Canons of Ethics.'o At the same time
the standards established by the Commis-
sioner seem to have been met, so that the
law corporation may receive favorable tax
treatment." Thus, Florida has been able
to bestow upon its bar members the bene-
fits of corporate taxation, without substan-
tially affecting the basic attorney-client
relationship, in. a form which will not vio-
late the Canons of Ethics.
It would appear that the action taken by
Florida and other states regarding profes-
sional corporations and associations will
prompt Congress to take another look at
the Jenkins-Keogh Bill, if only to allow it
to regulate the amount of tax benefit to
be gained by this type of organization. Just
as the rash of adoptions of community
property statutes prompted the federal
government to allow the joint return, so
also might the passage of a number of state
laws permitting professional incorporation,
which may be prompted by the ABA's
Opinion 303, induce federal action. Until
such time, however, the Florida decision is
worthy of note by those attorneys who
would benefit by incorporation and who
are willing to voice an opinion in support of
professional corporation statutes.
-to In the Matter of The Florida Bar, - Fla. -,
133 So. 2d 554 (1961).
41 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701 (1960). See note 22
supra.
